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RECENT ACTION IN THE NO-MAN'S
LAND OF LABOR LAW
By WALTER L. GERASH
Walter L. Gerash received his
A.B., Univ. of California, 1949;
A.M., Univ. of Chicago, 1951;
L.B., Univ. of Denver, June, 1956.
The following article was written
while Mr. Gerash was a student at
the University of Denver.
The purposes of this article are three-fold: 1) to discuss briefly
the general doctrine of federal pre-emption; 2) to point out some
of the exceptions to the doctrine; and 3) to discuss extensively the
leading state agency and court decisions when the NLRB under its
new jurisdictional standards refuses or actually declines to exercise
its jurisdiction. In short the question posed is: "What have the
various states done when this vacuum or no man's land is created?"'
THE DIKE OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
Since John Marshall said in 1824 that commerce was "inter-
course" the Commerce Clause has been expanded to embrace a mul-
titude of things that Congress can regulate.2 From the wages of
a window washer who washed windows once a week to an automo-
bile plant,3 to the wheat grown by a single farmer for his own con-
1 Following is a list of articles published in the Labor Law Journal concerning the subject and
the many ramifications therein: Arthur K. Gorfinkel 'Conflict Between Federal and State Jurisdiction"
(December 1951) P. 1007; Keith Lorenz "Conflict of Jurisdiction Between 'he National and State
Labor Relations Boards" (December 1951) p. 887; Editors "Federal-State Relations in Labor Law"
(March 1950) p. 419; Jay E. Shonklin "How NLRB Has Applied Its Jurisdictional Standards" (June
1951) p. 391; Phillip Feldblum "Jurisdictional 'Tidelands' in Labor Relations" (February 1952) p.
114; Edward L. Schwartz "Local Business-No Man's Land in Labor Relations" (December 1949) p.
189; Mozart G. Rotner, "Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations" (November
1952) p. 350; Wilbur L. Pollard, "Federal Labor Low Administrative Recession" (December 1955)
p. 863; R. H. Roche Jr. and K. L. Hanslowe, "NLRB Absolutism-A Dogma Revisited" (May 1955)
p. 279; Fred Witney, "NLRB Jurisdictional Policies and the Federal-State Relationship" (January
1955) p. 3; Walter L. Daykin, "NLRB Jurisdictional Standards I" (September 1955) p. 617; Walter
L. Daykin, "NLRB Jurisdictional Stanards I1" (October 1955) p. 696.
See also Proceeding of New York University, Fifth Annual Conference On Labor, Emanuel
Stein, editor (New York: Mathew Bender and Co., Inc., 1952) pp. 1, 77, 119; First Annual Con-
ference p. 463; Second Annual Conference, p. 505; Third Annual Conference, p. 277; Seventh Annual
Conference p. 1 and Eighth Annual Conference, p. 1.
The law review articles are many but several leading ones are: Archibald Cox and Marshall
J. Seidman, "Federalism and Labor Relations," 64 Harvard Law Review, p. 1297 (June 1950);
LaeI S. De Muth, "Federal State Jurisdlction-A Pre-emption Question," 27 Rocky Mountain Law
Review, p. 330 (April 1955); Austin F. Shute, "State Versus Federal Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes;
The Garner Case," 19 Missouri Law Review, p. 110 (April 1954); George Roumell and Peter Schlesinger,
"The Preemption Dilema In Labor Relations," 18 University of Detroit Law Journal (December 1954),
January 1955 pp, -17, 135.
2Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
SMartino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co. 10 Labor Cases No. 51220. 327-U.S. 173 (1946).
DICTA July-August, 1956
sumption; these constitute parts of this vast expanse of Federal
regulation.
4
In the field of labor relations the National Labor Relations Act
(hereafter referred to as NLRA) was passed on the theory that a
promulgation and protection of collective bargaining would reduce
the irritants to the flow of commerce. The act was declared consti-
tutional because a strike at the point of production in a large in-
terstate industry would have an "immediate and . . . catastrophic"
effect on commerce5 The Act was "to diminish the causes of labor
disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce,
to create a national labor relations board and for other purposes.";
Likewise the purpose of the LMRA was "... for the mediation of
labor disputes affecting commerce ... "I
The pre-empting character of the Wagner Act was conclusively
proclaimed in 1945 when the U. S. Supreme Court struck down a
state labor law regulating union business agents." However, it was
not until the Bethlehem Case that the Supreme Court proclaimed
its views on the various jurisdictional problems.'
With the cornerstone of the Bethlehem decision laid, a host of
Supreme Court cases followed, forming the foundation of the dike
of Federal pre-emption. Thus wherever the NLRA and Taft-Hart-
ley Act apply, the entire field of labor relations is pre-empted to the
Federal government. 10
Wickard v. Filburn, 63 S. Ct. 82, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
3National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 1 Labor Cases No. 17017, 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
6 Act of July 5. 1935 c. 772, 49 State 449. 29 U.S. Code Sec. 151 ff (the preamble).
Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, 61 Stat. 136, Title II, 29 U.S. Code Sec. 171 ff. (the preamble).
8Hill v. Florida, 9 Labor Cases § 51208, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
"Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. New York State Labor Relations Board and Allegheny Ludlum
Steel Corp. v. Kelley, 12 Labor Cases 51245, 330 U.S. 767 (1947). Foremen in the two companies
filed a petition with the NLRB for certification of a bargaining unit for the foremen. This petition
was denied, the NLRB refused to take jurisdiction. Then the foremen filed a petition with the New
York State Labor Relations Board, which granted it. The companies sought an injunction in the
New York State Court to restrain the State Board from enforcing its order. The highest New York
court affirmed the order. U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that exclusion by the Wagner
Act must be implied from the nature of the legislation in absence of an express provision; that
state laws were invalid when Federal laws governed the same subject matter even though the
specific part covered by the state law was not as yet dealt with by the Federal agency set up
by the Federal law. The Court also held that a refusal to entertain jurisdiction was not an implied
granting or ceding of the power to the states. The Court felt that due to the need of uniformity
of regulation of a national problem on a national level it would be dangerous to allow a case
by case test of Federal supremacy..
Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion felt that a doctrinaire application of the majority
opinion to exclude all State activity would create a vacuum due to the immensity of the task and
the Federal budgetary limitations.
30 In the field of representation elections: La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment
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SOME WELL-KNOwN HOLES IN THE DIKE
There are several well-known exceptions to the rule of Fed-
eral pre-emption," two of which are to be found in the Taft-Hartley
Act. Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act permits the states to
regulate the law of union security agreements. Thus, although the
Taft-Hartley Act allows the union shop in section 8(a) (3), state
law can supersede Federal law in this regard. Eighteen states
have outlawed or restricted union shops.
The other exception in the Taft-Hartley Act is section 10(a)
Relations Board, 16 Labor Cases § 64913, 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Strike vote procedure: International
Union of United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imperent Workers v. O'Brien, 18 Labor
Cases § 6,5,761, 339 U.S. 454 (1950): state public utility law for compulsory arbitration: Amalgamated
Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board, 19 Labor Cases § 66,193, 340 U.S. 383 (1951); strike in breach of contract: Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, 27 Labor Cases § 69,064; stranger picketing: Garner v. Teamsters 24 Labor Cases
§ 68,020, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
For further analysis see Harry Brady, "Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age In Labor Relations"
5 Labor Low Journal 743 (November 1954).
In the above Garner case the court held that where a state acts under its anti-trust law,
the controlling Federal power must be resorted to, even though the ground of intervention on part
of the state is different than that on which Federal supremacy has been exercised.
Recently the Supreme Court voided a state court order based on a common low action since
it would be enforcing an unfair labor practise outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act. General Drivers,
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 89 et al. v. American Tobacco Co. Inc., 27 Labor Cases
69,082, 348 U.S. 962 (1955).
Federal courts are not allowed to enjo'n an unfair labor practice on the motion of private
parties-only the NLRB can do so. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. & NLRB v. Textile Workers Union 14
Lobar Cases 64,443; 167 Fed. (2d) 183 (1948; I. L. W. U. Local 6, C.I.O. v. Sunset Line and
Twine Co., D.C., N.D. Calif. 14 Labor Cases 64,444, 77 F. Supp. 119 (1948).
The principln of the exhaustion of administrative remedies must be adhered to not only in the
Federal Courts but in the state tribunals as well. See Costaro v. Simons 19 Labor Cases 66,295,
302 N.Y. 318, 198 N.E. (2d) 454 (1951).
1 William Isaacson, "Federal Versus State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations," Proceeding of
New York University, Eighth Annual Conference on Labor (New York, 1955) p. 1.
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allowing the NLRB to cede jurisdiction of its cases to any state
agency, even though such cases may affect interstate commerce.
However, the scope of section 10(a) is restricted by a further
clause which holds that state law must be consistent with a cor-
responding provision of the Federal law and must have received
a similar construction as the Federal law.
A third exception to the doctrine of Federal pre-emption is
where the economic facts show that there is no effect on inter-
state commerce. However, the effect on interstate commerce can
embrace a multitude of areas and acts not on their face interstate
commerce. Thus, this exception is not only nebulous, but is most
elastic as well.
A fourth exception is based on the police power of the states.
This authority is exercised where there is an imminent threat or
actual breach of the peace, as in mass picketing,12 sit-down strikes,13
and "quicky" strikes.
14
A fifth and recent exception is the allowance of damage suits
in state courts.
15
.Allen Bradley v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 5 Labor Cases J 51,135; 315
U.S. 740 (1942).
'5 N.L.R.B. v. Fonsteel Metallurgical Corp., 1 Labor Cases § 17,042; 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
4 U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 16 Labor Cases § 64,992; 336 U.S. 245
(1949).
'9 United Construction Workers v. Laburnam Construction Corp., 26 Labor Cases § 68,460; 347
U.S. 656 (1953).
Union agents threatened the employees with violence to force them to join the union. Because
of these circumstances, the employer abandoned his construction work and then sued for the re-
sulting damages. Although the acts were an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8 of the
N L.R .B., the question arose as to whether the N.L.R.B. had exclusive jurisdiction over the subect
matter, so as to pre-empt the state court in hearing an action based on common low tort. The
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The sixth exception is at present unresolved by the Supreme
Court and can be stated in the form of a question: what can the
states do when the NLRB declines to exercise its pre-emptive ju-
risdiction because of its self-imposed "yardstick" standards? This
"no-man's land" or "vacuum" is called such because it is a situation
where the states have no jurisdiction, yet the NLRB refuses to
take jurisdiction.'"
STATE DECISIONS REFUSING JURISDICTION
At the outset it should be recognized that even within some
states there are conflicting decisions as to whether a state does
have jurisdiction when the NLRB declines. When the NLRB de-
clines to exercise its jurisdiction based on its yardstick minima,
Congress did not intend that this would re-invest the state courts
with jurisdiction. Thus far, the most cogently reasoned decision
following this position is a Michigan Circuit Court ruling 17 where
a retail automobile dealer petitioned for an injunction to restrain
a union from picketing in violation of a state statute and the Taft-
Hartley Act. At the outset, the Court recognized that the question
of whether a state court has jurisdiction has not been resolved by
the highest court of the land.
Judge Searle in a brilliant opinion presented his analysis by
answering three questions. The first was what has the U.S. Su-
preme Court held in regard to the effect of the NLRA and the Taft-
Hartley Act upon the power of the state and its courts? The Court
then reviewed four leading decisions. In Bethlehem Steel' it was
concluded that if there are two administrative bodies dealing with
the same subject matter, the NLRB displaced the state Board.
The Court quoted Justice Jackson in Bethlehem saying "it has
long been the rule that exclusion of state action may be implied
from the nature of the legislation and the subject matter, although
express declaration of such a result is wanting."
In the LaCross Case, Judge Searle pointed out, that the Wis-
consin Board was Without authority to certify the employees' bar-
gaining representative in an industry engaged in interstate com-
merce--the court holding that a case by case test of supremacy
which would allow the state to act until the Federal Board has
acted is not permissible.'"
In the Garner Case, it was pointed out that the Supreme Court
affirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when it held that a
lower court was without jurisdiction to entertain a motion to en-
join picketing which was in violation of state and federal law.-"
court allowed the action on the basis that under the Wagner Act, there was no protection against
such union conduct, and since Taft-Hartley increased the responsibility of the unions (e.g. section 8 b)
the right to proceed in the state forum would not be denied. The rest of the reasoning that allowed
a by-pass of the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. was very weak.
'6 See Roche and Hanslow, "NLRB Absolutism-A Dogma Revisited," 6 Labor Low Journal 279.
This article concerns the political considerations underlying the Board's new standards. The article
also challenges the basic power of the Board to decline its jurisdiction. It also points out that
the Board's jurisdictional policies are discretionary and hence, subject to judicial review. The
author seems to agree with Board-member Murdock, that the new standards are not based on
practical consideratons, but are a subversion of Congressional policy
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A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedure was frowned
upon.
Finally in the Kinard Case, the Supreme Court reversed the
Alabama Supreme Court, which held that the employer was en-
titled to have unions enjoined from picketing.1I The Court held
that there was no clear showing that the employer applied to the
NLRB for appropriate relief or that it would be futile to do so.
The Court then pointed out that it realized a no-man's land existed
by saying, ". . . the Court does not pass upon the question sug-
gested by the opinion below of whether the State Supreme Court
could grant its own relief should the Board decline to exercise its
own jurisdiction."
The second question presented in the Michigan decision was,
"What has the Board done or decided in and by the announce-
ment of its 'standards' for the exercise or refusal to exercise juris-
diction?" Quoting the Board itself, from its sixteenth and seven-
teenth Annual Report together with the holding of the Star Beef
case ,'2 the court held that the question of the extent to which the
Board may be bound by its own prior policy decision not to take
jurisdiction over a certain industry is conclusive. The Board is not
precluded from asserting jurisdiction over an employer because
it previously has declined to process cases involving similarly
situated employers. The Board has jurisdiction all the time, accord-
ing to the court's holding.
- Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 24 Labor Cases § 68,086; 346 U.S. 933
(1954).
= NLRB v. Star Beef Co., 20 Labor Cases § 66.681; 193 F. 2d B (1951).
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The court went on to discuss the new "yardstick" standards
of July, 1954, and concluded that these standards do not deprive
the Board of jurisdiction, but merely indicate policy reasons why
it will not exercise the jurisdiction which it does have under the
law. Under the facts of the Universal case, supra, the NLRB in
the past did exercise jurisdiction in automobile agency fields and
the Supreme Court had sustained its jurisdiction. In essence,
Congress had taken frcm the state's agencies and courts such juris-
diction in automobile agency fields and the Supreme Court had
sustained its jurisdiction. In essence, Congress had taken from
the state's agencies and courts such jurisdiction. The mere fact
that the Board refuses to exercise its jurisdiction now does not
re-invest the states and the courts with jurisdiction which they
did not have, as long as the Board chooses ultimately to exercise
the jurisdiction given it by Congress.
The third and final question was that of whether state courts
have any jurisdiction when the NLRB refuses to exercise its ju-
risdiction on the basis of its yardstick standards? The court ap-
proved the reasoning of the Wags case, which will be discussed
below.2: It pointed to the language of the Taft-Hartley Act under
section 10(a), as the only intention of Congress to set aside reme-
dies for the State. The argument that Congress intended that the
states should act in cases where the void exists is weak, for Con-
gress did not remain silent-witness section 10a. Just because
Congress created the void due to its agency refusing jurisdiction,
the effect cannot be the legislating back to the states the juris-
diction taken from them-this can only be done by section 10a,
which was so specified.
The Court concluded that if the jurisdiction of the state courts
is to depend not upon the act of Congress and the actual jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB, but upon the month to month or day to day
discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by the Board, which depends
upon changing budgetary conditions or upon its economic, social
or political views as of the moment, then neither the courts nor
the litigants can ever know with any certainty where jurisdiction
lies. Neither will the litigants know whether in a given case,
jurisdiction existing at the time of its commencement will con-
tinue through the trial, on appeal, or until settled by the highest
court. As applied to the specific facts of the case, if the Supreme
Court were to agree that the state courts have jurisdiction in those
cases where the NLRB refuses to act, the Court would follow its
position as it stated in Kinard.-4 In this decision, the Court held
that the Michigan court was without jurisdiction since there was
an absence of an actual refusal to act by the NLRB.
A New York appellate court has held that the state court was
without jurisdiction and that the NLRB had jurisdiction even
where it had failed to exercise such jurisdiction. It commented:
"where the field of labor relations is occupied by the Federal Act
the State may not furrow. Accordingly, it follows that Federal
- New York State Labor Relations Board v. Wags Transportation System, 26 Labor Cases §
68,754; 130 N.Y. 2d 731 (1954)
2" See footnote 21.
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jurisdiction is not dependent upon whether the NLRB acts or
declines to act in the premises . . .,,25
The dissent in the Wags case argued that it is better to have
any action at the local level, rather than a "no-man's land" in
which neither Federal nor local boards could or would act.
A Connecticut court has held that the state Board of Labor
Relations does not have jurisdiction over an employer engaged in
the building material business.2" Its reasons were not exactly in
point with the Michigan case, since it based its rationale on the
fact that the NLRB had not declined to exercise its jurisdiction
over the employer as yet. It also noted that the employer's pur-
chases from outside the state during the year immediately pre-
ceeding the hearing were in excess of the NLRB's minimum yard-
stick requirements for assertion of jurisdiction. Therefore, the em-
ployer was subject to the NLRA and not subject to the Connecticut
Act. While this case is not directly in point, it recognizes displace-
ment of the state jurisdiction by Federal jurisdiction before any
self-limiting action on the part of the NLRB. However, it does
imply that the court might have held differently had the juris-
dictional minima of the NLRB not been met.
STATE DECISIONS TAKING JURISDICTION
The Universal case represents the strongest position of the de-
cisions of states not to take jurisdiction when the NLRB refuses
to assert its jurisdiction because of its self-inflicted standards.
There is a more recent Michigan case from the same judicial level,
but from another county, that has taken the contrary view.2 7
A general contractor had a contract with the several picketing
unions. The plumbing and electrical contractors had contracts
with a rival union. The Circuit Court held that the lower court
had jurisdiction to enjoin the unions from picketing the construc-
tion job. This ruling was handed down, even though the NLRB
would have jurisdiction of the matter, but for its 'jurisdictional
standards. The union's motion to dismiss on a plea to the juris-
diction was denied. This Michigan state court concluded that since
there was no direct inflow of goods or materials from out of the
2 See footnote 23.
' Norwich Lumber Co. v. Teamsters (Conn.) SLRB Decision No. 336 July 26, 1955, 1 29,322.
School District of City of Holland et al. v. Trades Council, Michigan Circuit Court, Ottowo






state valued at one-half million dollars per year, the NLRB's juris-
dictional standards of section 7 had not been met.2" The court
stated that, "For the purposes of this decision the court will assume
that the NLRB would refuse to act in the dispute which is the
subject of the litigation."
Another recent decision by the Michigan State Labor Media-
tion Board took a similar position .2 It held that since the NLRB
declined to take jurisdiction the employer and employees had
nowhere to go for its representation election. The Michigan Board
said, "The Board is strongly of the opinion that where a delegation
of authority is not acted upon by the Federal Government such
authority should revert to the state."
In this discussion, there are actually two questions before
the courts: 1) May state boards and courts take jurisdiction if the
NLRB does nothing and it appears that the jurisdictional minima
have not been met; and 2) May the state boards and courts take
jurisdiction when the NLRB does act, refusing to take jurisdiction
because of its invoking of the yardsticks?
In a New Jersey case, an injunction was issued to restrain
picketing, since the object was to destroy the employer's business
and not to organize the employees. Also, there were violations of
a temporary restraining order. In this case, the employer first peti-
tioned the NLRB to exercise its jurisdiction in the matter; and the
Board and the General Counsel declined to exercise their dis-
cretion.8 0
The Court held that the Taft-Hartley Act does not deprive the
court of jurisdiction since the NLRB did not act when so petitioned.
Arguing a similar policy position as in the previous case, the court
refused to have any "jurisdictional paralysis" set in and stated
that "the genius" of Federalism can prevent such paralysis.
A Texas case seems much in accord wich the Michigan School
District case,"' when it took judicial notice of the NLRB's juris-
dictional yardsticks2 " Here the court took over jurisdiction and
applied the state law, since under the NLRB's standards the Board
would "probably" decline jurisdiction over the employer. The
union, here, was picketing to compel the employer to recognize it
as the bargaining agent for its drivers. The court approved a tem-
porary injunction against picketing, since it appeared that the union
did not represent a majority, and also, since there was violence.
The union argued that the court did not have jurisdiction and
that there was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
the NLRB. They argued that appellee did not allege or show that it
sought relief before the NLRB or that the NLRB would not assert
or exercise its jurisdiction if invoked.
In what appears to be the only state supreme court decision
dealing with the topic thus far, answers to both of the above ques-
29 Federal Dairy Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 638 (No. 107) (1950). J 1615; 1615.15; 1615.85.
29 In re Teamsters Local 376, AFL and Walker Motors, Inc. (Michigan Labor Mediation Board
Decision July 7, 1955; § 49,318).
o Hammer v. Textile Workers, New Jersey 1945 Sup. Ct. Hudson Co., 27 Labor Cases § 68,938;
111 A. (2d) 308.
s1 See footnote 27.
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tions are given.:: It should be noted at the outset that the decision
was a four-to-three split, with both sides presenting the basic con-
flict that has been indicated in the decisions already discussed. In
the Garmon case, the California Court answered question one
above in the negative and question two in the affirmative. The
court held that the picketing of an employer doing interstate busi-
ness, even though a violation of the Federal Taft-Hartley Act, may
be enjoined where the NLRB has previously refused to assert its
jurisdiction of a representation proceeding involving the employer.
In the companion case, Benton,:" the court held that where there
was no actual refusal by the NLRB to assert jurisdiction, the state
courts do not have jurisdiction even though the employer's business
does not meet the minimum jurisdictional standards established
by the NLRB.
There were two picketing unions that were not certified in
the Garmon case. Both unions wanted a closed shop." The com-
pany refused to execute the contract believing it to be a violation
of the NLRA, since no election was held as yet. The NLRB refused
to take jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the
defendants should be designated as the collective bargaining rep-
resentatives of the employees of the plaintiff. A judgment was
entered against defendants for damages and an injunction was
issued.
The union's position was that the jurisdiction rests exclusively
with the NLRB, that the company did not exhaust its administra-
tive remedies, that the evidence did not support the findings, that
the findings did not include all the issues tendered, and that the
record shows no violation of any state law.
The Court held that thus far Congress had not prohibited the
states from assuming jurisdiction of conduct which would be an
unfair labor practice under the Federal law when the NLRB re-
fused to take jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the NLRB's
initial refusal to take a representation election was based on the
fact that the jurisdictional requirements were not met. Also, to
meet the union's arguments of not exhausting administrative reme-
se Drivers Union v. Jax Beer Co., Texas Ct. of Civil Appeals F;fth Supreme Judicial District §
14949 (1955).
IaGarmon v. Building Trades Council, 29 Labor Cases § 69642, 291 P. (2d), 1 (1956).
:t. Benton, Inc. v. Pointers Local 333, 29 Labor Cases § 69643, 291 P. (2d) 13 (1956).
Park and Tilford v. leamsters, 10 Labor Cases § 62,963; 27 Cal. (2d) 599 (1946).
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dies, the Court said that since the initial rejection of the petition
was based on yardstick grounds, it would be futile to get a review
of the Regional Director's action. Also, the fear of the "vacuum"
was argued. Thus, if the states are powerless after the NLRB
refuses jurisdiction, one of the parties can flout the policy ex-
pressed by Congress in national legislation.
Finally, at the same time that the court affirmed the state
court's jurisdiction, it held that, although union pressure for a
closed shop is legal in California, nevertheless, via the Taft-Hartley
Act, section 8 (b) (2), it is an unfair labor practice and not privi-
leged under California law.
In a vigorous dissent based on a four-fold analysis, Justice
Carter argued that:
1. Federal law is to be administered by the NLRB, not by
the state courts;
2. The Board, in refusing jurisdiction, held in effect, that
Federal law should not apply in this case;
3. It is neither feasible nor fair to apply Federal law;
4. There has been no such refusal to exercise jurisdiction
by the Board as to justify the conclusion that the state
court has jurisdiction.
Under point one, the dissent quoted from Garner7 in order to
show that the NLRB was the proper forum. Under point two,
Justice Carter showed that the Board can properly decline to act,
holding at the same time that the policies of the act would not be
effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case. By declining
jurisdiction, the NLRB does so due to the fact that the policies of
the act would not be effectuated by the Board's assertion of juris-
diction." Thus it follows that the state court should not apply
the Federal act where the Board refused to act.
Under point three, the dissent pointed out that in California
there was no state board to conduct elections, and thus, the deci-
sion results in discrimination. The state law should apply since
the NLRB refused jurisdiction. There was also a question as to
whether the NLRB actually and finally refused to take juris-
diction. Also, the administrative remedies were not exhausted,
since the employer did not appeal to Washington, thus leaving no
final determination in regard to the jurisdiction.
Finally, the dissent pointed out that there was an assumption
that the refusal to take jurisdiction of the case was ground for the
state court to take jurisdiction. This had not been ruled upon by
the U.S. Supreme Court. Also, there was not sufficient showing of
refusal to exercise jurisdiction, since the Board said no action
would be taken "at this time"; thus implying that a change of
conditions might bring about a different result or that the charge
of an unfair labor practice (which the majority of the California
Court found) would result in a NLRB action.
In a companion case, decided that same day by the California
Court, the general rule of Garmon was affirmed." However, the
"' See footnote 10.
- NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 19 Labor Cases § 66,347; 341 U.S.
675, 684 (1951).
• See footnote 3.5.
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court also recognized that where there was no refusal (merely in-
action) on the part of the NLRB to take the case on jurisdictional
grounds, the state court does not have jurisdiction in such a case.
Hence, merely because the amount of the employer's business does
not meet the minimum requirements of the NLRB's yardsticks,
this does not automatically confer jurisdiction on the state court.
While the case does affirm Garmon, it does run counter to the
cases that we have discussed which held that the courts may as-
sume that the NLRB won't act because the jurisdictional minima
have not been met.
In New York, there are two recent decisions that follow this
"assuming" position that was expressly rejected by the California
Court. In one case, the company's business was deemed predomi-
nantly local by the state board and thus held that the NLRB did
not have exclusive jurisdiction.40 Also, procedurally, the company
did not raise it before the N.Y. Board made its order against it.
The court also distinguished the situation from the Wags case,'
where there was no proof that the NLRB would have declined to
assume jurisdiction at the time the Wags proceedings were insti-
tuted. The N.Y.L.B. then found evidence that the employer was
guilty of unfair labor practice as defined by state law.
In the other New York case, the court approved the state
board's action of taking jurisdiction whether or not the amount of
business met the NLRB's yardsticks. 42 The employer contended
that the N.Y.L.B. was without jurisdictional standards of the
NLRB. The employer further contended that it is not for the state
board or courts to invoke these yardsticks, but for the NLRB.
Briefly, the Court held:
Where the National Board refuses to assert jurisdiction
labor disputes must be subject to regulation by the states
or they will not be regulated at all. Labor disputes may or
may not substantially affect interstate commerce, but they
invariably have an immediate and direct impact upon the
local community in which they occur. We do not believe
that Congress, which granted the National Board discre-
tionary power to decline jurisdiction, ever intended to pre-
vent the states when that occurs, from taking necessary
steps to protect their own safety, health, and welfare.
In a recent decision of the Michigan State Labor Mediation
Board it was held that since the NLRB actually declined to take
jurisdiction, it left the employers and the employees nowhere to
go regarding their representation election. Thus the Board con-
cluded that Michigan law should govern the authority, "... should
revert to the state."43
In Wisconsin, it was held that the state labor board was not
precluded from taking jurisdiction in a representation proceed-
ing over two lumber companies, the volume of business of which
O New York Board v. Marlene Transportation Co., 27 Labor Cases § 69,119; 139 N. Y. (2) 621
(1955).
"See footnote 23.
"Raisch Motors Case (N.Y. 1955) 18 SLRB No. 26 § 49,306.
"Teamsters Local 376 AFL and Walker Motors Inc. MLMB July 7, 1955, § 49,318.
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was less than the NLRB's minimum.44 This decision was based on
Garner, since the Supreme Court had not yet determined that state
action would be futile in the event that the NLRB refused to exer-
cise jurisdiction.
In another Wisconsin proceeding, where the General Counsel
of the NLRB dismissed the charges on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant further proceedings, the local board
held it had jurisdiction to determine matters relating to violations
of collective bargaining contracts. 45 This was so held even though
the employers were engaged in interstate commerce, since such
conduct was neither protected nor prohibited by the Taft-Hartley
Act.
In one Federal case, it was stated that until the NLRB
actually asserts its unexercised jurisdiction, a state court may,
under proper circumstances, restrain a union from picketing an
employer whose business does not measure up to the NLRB's an-
nounced jurisdictional standards.10 This case was recently reversed,
however, the court stating:
4 7
Moreover the refusal by the NLRB to entertain the
instant grievance on its merits did not of itself alter the
pertinent law thereby revesting the state court with au-
thority to proceed. Amended section 10 (a) of the Act speci-
fically provides what this Court deems to be the only
way state authorities can be vested with authority now
within the exclusive purview of the Act. Unless and until
there is an express ceding of jurisdiction to a proper state
44 Cooper-Utter Lumber Co., WERB May 24, 1954, LRRM 1290.
SJoseph W. Ryan v. Loberty Powder Defense Corp. (Wis. 1955) WERB Dec. No. 3895 Feb. 11,
1955 J 49498.
' Your Food Stores of Santa Fe Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 27 Labor Cases § 68867, 124 F. Supp. 697
(1954). The suit was for trespass and damages, which under the Laburnum reasoning (a well known
exception to the pre-emption doctrine) did not deprive a state court of jurisdiction to try a case
filed for damages in a tort action regardless if it was also an unfair labor practice within Taft-
Hartley. In this case the NLRB refused on its yardstick basis to issue complaints asked for by the
union in regard to the employer's unfair labor practice. The Court cited another well-known
exception to the pre-emption doctrine, the Briggs-Stratton case (International Union U.A.W., AFL v.
WERB 16 Labor Cases 64,992, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) which allowed the state to police "partial
strike" activities under the state police power. The court in this New Mexico case, agreed that if
the NLRB does exercise its jurisdiction, the jutrisdiction of the state court would cease. Its decision,
however, was that until the NLRB actually asserts its unexercised jurisdiction, a state court may
under proper circumstances, restrain picketing if on trial of the merits thereof, said picketing is
deemed to be a trespass which in law and equity is subject to an injunction. This holding seemed
to be a clue to the attorney to always join a trespass or damage action or better to bring it in
lieu of an unfair labor practice if the NLRB does not take jurisdiction in order to get into a state
court. This case was reversed on appeal.
47 Retail Clerks Local No. 1564 v. Your Foods Stores of Santa Fe U.S. CCA, 10th, 225 F. (2d)
659 (1955).
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agency exclusive jurisdiction remains in the federal agency.
For sake of order such must be true. Otherwise an inter-
minable problem of determining jurisdiction would exist,
throwing needless confusion into an area clearly pre-empted
by Congress.
Thus, it is now clear, at least in the 10th Circuit, the NLRB's
refusal pursuant to its 1954 yardstick standards to assert jurisdic-
tion of a union's picketing against an interstate employer does not
vest the state court with jurisdiction over picketing.
CONCLUSION AND COMMENT
It has been estimated by an authority that at least in New
York over twenty-five percent of the employees and their em-
ployers are being deprived not only of their day in court, but also
of their rights and obligations under the Federal labor laws . 4 This
wrong without a remedy situation is the strongest argument for
the state courts that have taken jurisdiction when the NLRB de-
clines.
Not only is there an actual lack of coverage when the states
refuse to take jurisdiction after the NLRB declines, but generally,
the quality of coverage is inferior when the states do take juris-
diction. Most states, even large ones like California, do not have
active labor boards.
There is an operational uncertainty for both labor and manage-
ment, since what the NLRB giveth, it may taketh away. Yardstick
standards change; they are self-imposed and are guides only and
can be relaxed or changed as the board sees fit. Thus, the basis of
state intervention is a shifting one, dependent upon the NLRB's
operational guide. During the middle of a case or between appeal,
the parties could be thrown out on new jurisdictional grounds de-
pending upon the ever shifting sands of the yardsticks and the dis-
cretion of the NLRB. Confusion and uncertainty are mounting
among and within the states.
If the Garmon holding is adhered to by the Supreme Court it
will constitute a set-back to the pre-emption concept and the en-
tire purposes of Federal laws concerning collective bargaining.
Industry-wide bargaining will be an involved, if not an impossible
task, should this decision be affirmed. Different states have dif-
ferent laws concerning labor relations. For example, some parts
of a contract legal in State A would be illegal in State B. Also
different states have different laws in regard to the setting of the
ultimate strike date. To let the states apply different laws affect-
ing nation-wide industry is contrary to economic realities and the
purposes of all modern Federal Labor Laws that collective bar-
gaining should be spread as a national policy to improve the
social and economic conditions of labor and the country. Even a
conservative Congress has recognized this and has pidgeon-holed
attempts by openly anti-labor elements to further limit the juris-




diction of the NLRB45 and to cede tm the states full power to
regulate industries 0
As pointed out by Judge Searle in the Michigan Universal Car
case, the national policy of federal labor law and the jurisdiction
of the states cannot depend on the month to month or day to day
discretion of the NLRB, nor the different laws of the states. 1. To
base jurisdiction and the consequent application of substantive
law on changing budgetary conditions or upon the economic, po-
litical, or social views of the moment, establishes a situation
where neither the courts nor the litigants will ever know where
jurisdiction is since it may change at any time during the disposition
of the case-before action, during trial, on appeal, before decision
rendered by the Supreme Court, or even afterward!
The final answer lies with appropriate legislation by Congress.
Whether it would be to expand the budget to enable the NLRB
effectually to function and abolish its yardsticks or to blanket all
workers whose work affects interstate commerce, is for Congress
to determine. What is obvious is that the Taft-Hartley Act is in
need of revision in order to delineate Federal and State control
and to make the law applicable to all concerned.
49 The Smith Bill S. 1785, 83rd Congress 1st Sess. (1953).
-O°The Goldwater Bill S. 1161, 83rd Congress 1st Sess. (1953).
a, See footnote 17.
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